Abstract:
Taking post-2001Afghanistan as a case study, this article looks
at the impact of state-building interventions on formal and
informal institutions in a post-conflict state. Efforts to
reconstruct Afghanistan after international intervention in 2001
remain under-researched in terms of studying the problematic
interplay of contestation and collaboration between formal and
informal institutions and its complex linkages with desired statebuilding goals. Notwithstanding the dominance of local,
informal and traditional governance structures, attempts at
introducing formal, centralist and top-down institutions have
generally disregarded the social context of institutional success.
As a consequence, adherence to formal practices is low, raising
issues of legitimacy and effectiveness of state-building practices.
The interplay between informal and the formal, in which de
facto and de jure try to influence each other, show complex
patterns of contestation when goals are non-complementary or
dysfunctional; and cooperation when such goals are
complementary and functional. In Afghanistan, such paradoxical
interplay has been demonstrated in examples such as the formal
engagement with community-based policing structures
(Arbakai), customary dispute resolution bodies (Jirgas) and
tribal (Qawm) elder‟s role in state-related functions. This
interaction does not show linear lines of either cooperation or
contestation; rather a complex mix of both, sometimes in the
same domain. The varied attempts made by the state as well as
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in
engaging informal institutions for successful governance
practices illustrate that bottom-up processes need to be engaged
for increasing the effectiveness of formal institution building.
