Abstract:
India has pursued the development and acquisition of a ballistic
missile defence (BMD) system since the 1990s. Its indigenous system
consists of a two-tier system that aims at intercepting ballistic missiles at
higher and lower altitudes. It has also tried to acquire BMD systems or
components from the US, Russia and Israel over the years. The
development of ballistic missile defence by India challenges the very
basis of deterrence. The concept of deterrence is based on mutual
vulnerability. Ballistic missile defence disturbs deterrence by at least
theoretically providing the Indian side protection against incoming
ballistic missiles. Even though missile defence is not completely
foolproof, it is costly, and at the moment only provides limited cover. Still
it provides a false sense of security to the Indian leadership, making them
act with belligerence in a crisis. Thus, it increases instability and deepens
Pakistan’s security dilemma vis-à-vis India. The paper argues that BMD
erodes the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. It also increases
the balance of resolve in India’s favour in any crisis, whereby it is willing
to take higher risk knowing that it would have protection from BMD if
events spiral out of control. It leaves Pakistan open to Indian aggression,
coercion, and even intervention. It also encourages preemption.
Pakistan’s best option to counter the instability introduced by missile
defence is to pursue a mix of qualitative and quantitative enhancements
to its nuclear and missile forces
