Abstract:
This article critically analyses the paradoxical flux situation in South
Asia in view of both countries’ possession of tactical nuclear weapons
(TNWs), strategic arsenals, substantial conventional potentials, and
divergent war plans in a heightened state of stability-instability equation.
Conceptually, this sets the stage for an interesting debate on whether or
not the arrival of TNWs is a destabilising or stabilising factor in the
existence of present-day volatile regional security environment. The risk
of nuclear escalation is perennial and essentially at the core of the
stability-instability paradox as well. It is observed that a possibility of a
limited military acceleration to a nuclear level cannot be ruled out.
Moreover, the arrival and integration of TNWs has too become a reality,
which makes it imperative for them to do some diplomatic footwork to
resolve their bilateral issues. Therefore, instead of pretending to negate
the existence of TNWs in parallel with the asymmetric nature of their
strategic relationship, the rational course of approach would be not to
destabilise the structure of nuclear deterrence stability with the crafting
of aggressive and faulty strategies under fanciful labels to coerce each
other.
