dc.description.abstract |
Wireless Networks call for enhanced confidentiality, integrity and
authentication services because of their inherent weakness. ‘Counter Mode
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol’ (CCMP)
has recently been employed to replace flawed ‘Wired Equivalent Privacy’
(WEP) Protocol for the provision of security to IEEE 802.11 wireless local
area networks (WLAN). Meanwhile, IEEE 802.11s – draft standard for
wireless mesh networks (WMN) – has also proposed to use CCMP. CCMP,
a two pass process, introduces considerable latency in multi-hop wireless
networks, such as WMN. Increase in latency leads to a decrease in the
quality of service for delay sensitive real-time multimedia applications.
This research exposes the vulnerability of CCMP against pre-
computation time memory trade-off (TMTO) attack and proposes a
framework to strengthen the security of WLAN packets using Per-Packet
security mechanism. Furthermore, a novel, robust and low latency
framework for WMN is also proposed. The architecture of security
framework involves introduction of piggyback challenge response protocol
for providing data confidentiality and data integrity. Piggyback challenge
response protocol offers fresh encryption key for every packet, per-packet
authentication and use of secret nonce. Authentication of every packet offers
prompt defense against unauthorized access. It is also demonstrated that the
security framework is robust against a variety of security attacks. Encrypted
and unique nonce provides unpredictability and freshness. Unpredictability
prevents pre-computation attack and freshness ensures successful defense
against replay attacks. Proposed framework is simulated and its
iiperformance is compared with IEEE 802.11i in terms of latency introduced
by the security components. For single hop, latency due to the proposed
protocol is less than half as compared to CCMP. The improvement in
latency becomes more pronounced as the number of hops increase. This
novel framework addresses the CCMP deficiencies of high latency and
vulnerability against TMTO attack, without compromising any of the
security measures implemented in the standard. |
en_US |