Towards a Cybernetic Foundation for Natural Resource Governance

Abstract

This study explores the potential of the cybernetic method of inquiry for the problem of natural resource governance. The systems way of thinking has already enabled scientists to gain considerable headway in framing global environmental challenges. On the other hand, technical solutions to environmental problems have begun to show significant promise, driven by the advent of technology and its increased proliferation in coupled human and natural systems. Such settings lie on the interface of engineering, social and environmental sciences, and as such, require a common language in order for natural resources to be studied, managed and ultimately sustained. In this dissertation, we argue that the systems theoretic tradition of cybernetics may provide the necessary common ground for examining such systems. After discussing the relevance of the cybernetic approach to natural resource governance, we present a mathematical model of resource consumption, grounded in social psychological research on consumer behavior. We also provide interpretations of the model at various levels of abstraction in the social network of the consuming population. We demonstrate the potential of the model by examining it in various theoretic frameworks which include dynamical systems, optimal control theory, game theory and the theory of learning in games. Each framework yields different policy guidelines to avoid Tragedy of the Commons like scenarios in the natural resource system. Mainly, we find that a high importance attached to social information (rather than ecological information) on part of the consumers helps overcome free-riding behavior and achieves affluence in both the resource stock and consumption levels. Moreover, we observe that discounting future utility beyond a specific threshold results in unsustainable consumption patterns according to a pre-defined notion of sustainability. We study the optimal control law for both sustainable and unsustainable cases, and give a rigorous criterion for sustainable growth. Later we examine the long-term effects of rational behavior on the part of the consumers and compare it with the collectively optimal outcome via a non-cooperative game and see how different societal attributes effect the “tragicness” of the game. We show that the adoption of a basic fictitious play learning scheme by the consumers results in the equilibrium solution in a way that avoids free-riding behavior. All aspects of the analysis are conducted with one single question in mind – what are the favorable conditions for sustainability?