Abstract:
The study attempts to critically examine the current state of nuclear deterrence stability between South Asian arch rivals – India and Pakistan – in the context of non-state actors and their potential to cause nuclear terrorism and nuclear crises in the region. India and Pakistan use selective non-state actors for proxy warfare against each other. Both provide rationale and logic behind such dangerous policies. The study tries to empirically investigate this „peculiar‟ behavior of both the nuclear states and examines possible repercussions on nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia. While emphasizing the rapidly increasing trajectories of nuclear arsenals in both the states, the study analyses the impact of such trends on nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the dissertation notes how technological and doctrinal changes could endanger nuclear deterrence keeping in view the undermining role of non-state actors in the region. The main focus of the study is to evaluate the “sky is falling” argument by discussing possible scenarios of nuclear escalation between both the nuclear states.
